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CRIMINAL LAW COMMENTS
Collateral Relief From Convictions in Violation of Due Process
in Illinois*
In recent years a considerable number of cases in the federal courts
sitting in Illinois and two United States Supreme Court cases have
dealt with the problem of collateral relief to prisoners in Illinois who
claim that they are being held in violation of their constitutional rights.
The broadened interpretation given to the due process clause' and to
the scope of review upon habeas corpus 2 by the United States Supreme
Court in the last fifteen years warrants a re-examination of the pro-
cedures available in the Illinois courts and in the federal district courts
sitting in Illinois to obtain collateral relief from convictions alleged
to have been obtained in violation of due process. This comment will
attempt to set forth the remedies available within the state and federal
courts to prisoners held in Illinois and will suggest possible improve-
ments of the procedure in the Illinois courts.3
Writ of Error Coram Nobis in Illinois4
In Illinois the proper method of obtaining collateral relief from con-
victions alleged to have been obtained in violation of due process is
said to be through use of the statutory motion substituting the common
* This comment also appears in 42 Ill. L. Rev. 329 (1947).
1 Right to counsel in cases of serious crimes is a fundamental constitutional
right guaranteed by the due process clause of the 14th Amendment. Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932) (where the defendant in a capital case is incapable
of adequately making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble-mindedness,
illiteracy or the like, it is the duty of the court, whether requested to or not, to
assign counsel for him as a necessary prerequisite of due process of law); Smith v.
O'Grady, 312 U. S. 329 (1941) (violation of due process when defendant was
tricked into pleading guilty of burglary without aid of counsel); Williams v. Kaiser,
323 U. S. 471 (1945) (denial of counsel in a robbery case); Tompkins v. Missouri,
323 U. S. 485 (1945) (ineffective representation in a murder case); House v. Mayo,
324 U. S. 42 (1945); White v. Ragen, 324 U. S. 760 (1945); Hawk v. Olson, 326
U. S. 271 (1945); De Meerleer v. People of Michigan, ... U. S. ... , 67 S. Ct. 596
(1947); of. Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455 (1942) (there is no absolute right to
counsel under the 14th Amendment in all cases where the defendant can take care
of his own interests and the issues are narrow; state court did not appoint a
counsel in a robbery case); Rice v. Olson, 324 U. S. 786 (1945) (pleading guilty
does not automatically waive right to counsel under the 14th Amendment); Canizio
v. New York, 327 U. S. 82 (1946) (presence of counsel on day of sentence was
held to correct the due procepss inadequacy in earlier stages of the proceeding).
See Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60, 76 (1941).
Use of a confession obtained through coercion is a denial of due process and pro-
tected by the 14th Amendment. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936); Cham-
bers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227 (1940); Asheraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143 (1944);
327 U. S. 274 (1946); of. Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219 (1941).
The knowing use of material perjured testimony by a state prosecutor would
make a trial unfair within the meaning of the 14th Amendment. Mooney v. Halohan,
294 U. S. 103 (1935); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U. S. 213 (1942); of. People ex rel.
Whitman v. Wilson, 318 U. S. 688 (1943); Lutz v. Ragen, 324 U. S. 760 (1945).
2 See cases cited infra note 48; see text infra at note 70.
3 This comment will not deal with the problem of scope of review upon writ of
error in Illinois where the reviewing court has only the common law record before
it and the defendant claims he was deprived of adequate representation by counsel,
but the common law record indicates that he was admonished of the meaning of
his plea of guilty as required by the Illinois statute (I1. Rev. Stat. 1945 e 38, § 732).
The case of Carter v. Illinois, 328 U. S ... , 67 S. Ct. 216 (1946) illustrates this
problem.
4 For a general discussion of writ of error coram nobis in Illinois see Comment
(1937) 31 III. L. Rev. 644.
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law writ of error coram nobis.5 In 1871 the writ of error coram nobis
was abolished by statute 6 and the present method of motion in the
nature of writ of error coram nobis was substituted giving the same
relief that was available under the common law writ except that the
motion has to be brought within five years after rendition of final
judgment.7 This provision was reenacted in substantially the same
form in the Practice Act of 19078 and is now Section 72 of the present
Civil Practice Act.9 The common law writ of error coram nobis was
a writ to the same court which rendered the judgment because of
some error in fact which Tidd characterized as "not the error of the
judges, and (thus) reversing it is not reversing their own judgment."' 1
Although the statute is silent as to whether the motion in nature, of
writ of error coram nobis is available in criminal cases, it has been
interpreted as applicable in criminal as well as civil cases." .It is even
available after the Supreme Court of Illinois has affirmed the convic-
tion of the trial court, since ". . . the original finding of the court is
not disputed or contested, but the bill proceeds on the theory that
newly discovered facts would produce a different decree."' 12 This
remedy is available for the purpose of revoking a judgmeni for some
error in point of fact which does not appear on the face of the record
and which, if known at the time the judgment was rendered, would
have prevented its rendition.'3 Coram nobis is not the proper remedy
5 Van Woods v. Neirstheimer, 328 U. S. 211 (1946); of. People v. Crooks, 326
Ill. 266, 157 N. E. 218 (1927).
6 Ill. Laws, 1871, p. 348, § 66.
7 See infra, note 29.
8,111. Laws, 1907, p. 461, § 89.
9 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1945) c. 110, § 72. "The writ of error coram nobis is hereby
abolished, and all errors in fact, committed in the proceedings of any court of
record and which, by the common law, could have been corrected by said writ, may
be corrected by the court in which the error was committed, upon motion in writing,
made at any time within five years after the rendition of final judgment in the
case, upon reasonable notice. When the person entitled to make such motion shall
be an infant, non compos mentis or under duress, at the time of passing judgment,
the time of such disability shall be excluded from the computation of said five
years. " I
In discussing the characteristics of the motion in the nature of writ of error
coram nobis in Illinois, references made to eases interpreting § 89 of the Practice
Act of 1907 are applicable to § 72 of the present Civil Practice Act since they are
identical and have been given the same construction. Seither and Cherry Co. v.
Board, 283 Ill. App. 401 (1936); People v. McArthur, 283 Ill. App. 467 (1936).
10 2 Tidd (ed. of 1807), 1056; Stephen, On Pleading (1867) 118. For a short
discussion of the elements of writ of error coram nobis see Moore and Rodgers,
Federal Relief from Civil Judgments (1946) 55 Yale L. J. 623, 669-674. For more
elaborate treatment see: Freedman, The Writ of Error Coram Nobis (1929) 3
Temple L. Q. 365; Orfield, The Writ of Error Coram Nobis in Civil Practice (1934)
20f Va. L. Rev. 423.
11 People v. Crooks, 326 Ill. 266, 157 N. E. 218 (1927); People v. Moran, 342
Ill. 478, 174 N. E. 532 (1930); People v. Dabbs, 372 Ill. 160, 23 N. E. (2d) 343
(1939); People v. Rave, 392 Ill. 435, 65 N. E. (2d) 23 (1946).
12 People v. Dabbs, 372 Ill. 160, 23 N. E. (2d) 343 (1939) ; cf. People v. Gleits-
man, 396 I1. 499, 72 N. E. (2d) 208 (1947) (coram nobis does not lie for newly
discovered evidence nor to correct false testimony, particularly after the judgment
of the trial court was affirmed by the supreme court). The Gleitsman case indicates
that the writ would lie "if a person was insane, if he was a minor under the age
of criminal liability, if he was incarcerated, so he could not produce a defense".
13 People ex rel. O'Connell v. Noonan, 276 Ill. 430, 114 N. E. 928 (1916) ; People
ex i-el. Courtney v. Green, 355 Ill. 468, 189 N. E. 500 (1934); People v. Rave, 392
Ill. 435, 65 N. E. (2d) 23 (1946).
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when the errors relied upon were a matter of record and before the
court when the judgment was rendered.' 4 The rule is well established
that such a motion is not available to review questions of fact which
are raised by the pleadings or to correct errors of the court upon
questions of law.'5
The motion in nature of writ of error coram nobis in Illinois is an
appropriate remedy to set aside a conviction obtained by duress or
fraud, or where the defendant without negligence, through excusable
mistake or ignorance, had been deprived of defence. 16 Thus, "a con-
viction based on a plea forced by fear of mob law or by other fear
of the defendant induced by misconduct of the officers of the court
or by other officers of the law in whose custody a confession was ob-
tained by unlawful means", could be set aside on a motion in the
nature of writ of error coram nobis.17 However, the burden of proof
is on the one seeking to set aside the judgment of conviction to prove
the facts alleged in his petition or motion by preponderance of evi-
dence.18 Since the proceeding under this motion is said to be civil
in nature and judgment thereon is final, either the state or the de-
fendant in a criminal case is entitled to review.19 Thepefore, when the
trial court discharges a petitioner upon such proceedings on the
ground that he had inadequate representation by counsel, the order
cannot be expunged by a mandamus proceeding on the part of the
people, but must be appealed as a final judgment. 20 Where the peti-
tioner has failed to present a defense because of his own negligence 2 '
or where the error claimed was not an error of fact which would have
changed the sentence, 22 the remedy of writ of error coram nobis is
not available.
Although the remedy of coram nobis may be appropriate where
14 Jerome v. 5019-21 Quincy Street Building Corp., 385 1l. 524, 53 N. E. (2d)
444 (1944).
- 15 Marabia v. Mary Thompson Hospital, 309 Ill. 147, 140 N. E. 836 (1923);
Village of Downers Grove v. Glos, 316 I1. 563, 147 N. E. 390 (1925); People v.
Crooks, 326 Ill. 266, 157 N. E. 218 (1927).
16 See cases cited supra note 13.
17 People v. Crooks, 326 III. 266, 280, 157 N. E. 218, 223 (1927); Saunders v.
State, 85 Ind. 318, 44 Am. Rep. 29 (1882); State v. Calhoun, 50 Kan. 523, 83 Pac.
38 (1893).
18 People v. Long, 346 Ill. 646, 178 N. E. 918 (1931) ; People ex rel. Courtney v.
Green, 355 1l. 468, 189 N. E. 500 (1934).
19 People v. McArthur, 283 Ill. App. 467 (1936); cf. People v. Cohen, 376 Ill.
382, 33 N. E. (2d) 593 (1941) (it is essentiaily a civil proceeding and may not be
reviewed in the Illinois Supreme Court by writ of error).
20 People ex rel. Courtney v. Green, 355 Ill. 468, 189 N. E. 500 (1934).
21 People v. Bruno, 346 Ill. 449, 179 N. E. 129 (1931) (failure to use alibi);
People v. Ogbin, 368 Ill. 173, 13 N. E. (2d) 162 (1938) (failure to use alibi known
at time of trial); People v. McArthur, 283 ll. App. 467 (1936) (where defendant
failed to call a witness because of alleged hostility, he cquld not upQn a motion in
the nature of writ of error corani nobis set Aside thp convirtiop op the grounds of
excusable mistake, particularly when the witness testimony would not necessarily
have proved his innocence); People v. Whitmer, 304 Ill. App. 258, 26 N. E, (2d)
150 (1940) (abstract only) (where petitioner claims he was unable to produce a
piece of evidence because of illness of his counsel, and that the information did
not come to his attention lntil entry of the judgment, relief was denied without
a hearing).
22 People v. Moran, 342 Ill. 478, 174 N. E. 532 (1930); Jehnston v. People,
383 Ill. 91, 48 N. E. (2d) 350 (1943).
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there are claims of due process violations, 23 there have been some
cases denying relief upon the ground that the technical requirements
of the motion had not been met.24 Before granting relief under such
a motion the court is confronted with the requirement of finding that
the errors complained of were not known to the court and are mis-
takes of fact rather than law.25 The court must next decide whether
or not the error was due to the negligence of the petitioner and the
defense known to him at the time of trial.26 Thus, since a proceeding
in the nature of coram nobis is said to be the only proper method of
obtaining a hearing upon a claim of due process violation in Illinois
when this error is not part of the record,27 relief may sometimes be
denied upon technical considerations which are characteristic of the
common law writ.
28
Another serious inadequacy is the fact that the statutory motion
is apparently not available after the five year limitation as set forth
in Section 72 of the Civil Practice Act.29 Incarceration3 0 or alleged
inability to get the necessary papers beyond the prison walls because
of a prison rule3 l will not toll the five year limitation for filing the
23 People v. Long, 346 Ill. 646, 178 N. E. 918 (1931) (attorney represented two
defendants having adverse interests and entered a plea of guilty without consulting
the petitioner; court held that petitioner was entitled to a hearing upon a motion
for writ of error coram nobis); Saunders v. State, 85 Ind. 318, 44 Am. Rep. 29
(1882) (when defendant pleaded guilty to crime of murder because of a threatening
mob, conviction was set aside upon writ of error coram nobis); cf. People ex rel.
Courtney v. Green, 355 I1. 468, 189 N. E. 500 (1934) (in a proceeding in the
Municipal Court in Chicago judgments for misdemeanors were set aside where
defendants were not represented by counsel and were ignorant and unable to under-
stand ordinary legal terms).
24 People v. Drysch, 311 Ill. 342, 143 N. E. 100 (1924) (petitioner claimed he
was beaten into pleading guilty of robbery); People v. Schuedter, 336 Ill. 244, 168
N. E. 323 (1929) (where defendant pleaded guilty to a charge of murder upon the
understanding that he would only receive a 14 year sentence, the court held that
writ of error coram nobis was not available since the whole matter was presented to
and known to the trial judge and was no error of fact); People v. Sprague, 371
Ill. 627, 21 X. E. (2d) 763 (1939) (petitioner was convicted of the crime of acces-
sory to murder; he claimed that he did not have an attorney and that the court was
informed of this; that he entered the plea of guilty although he did not understand
that the crime of accessory to murder carried the same punishment as the crime of
murder; the court held that this was an error of law since the record showed that
the defendant had been admonished of the consequences of a plea of guilty and the
proper remedy was by writ of error).
25 See cases cited supra note 24.
26 See cases cited supra note 21.
27 Van Woods v. Neirstheimer, 328 U. S. 211 (1946); cf. People v. Crooks, 326
Ill. 266, 157 N. E. 218 (1927).
28 Moore and Rodgers, Federal Relief from Civil judgments (1946) 55 Yale L. J.
623, 671. 'Other cases illustrate that the basis of coram nobis is narrow, and often-
ties a case that is beyond its scope is as meritorious as one within its purview."
At p. 674. "The relief given in coram nobis cases is given on a technical basis."
29 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1945) c. 110 § 72; People v. Rave, 392 Ill. 435, 65 N. E. (2d)
23 (1946); People v. Austin et al., 329 Ill. App. 276, 67 N. E. (2d) 883 (1946)
(abstract only).
The recent case of People v. Touhy, 397 Ill. 19, 72 N. E. (2d) 827 (1947),
approves the holding of the Rave case, indicating that the 5 year limitation of § 72
applies to criminal as well as civil cases.
30 People v. Rave, 392 Ill. 435, 65 N. E. (2d) 23 (1946).
31 People v. Austin et al., 329 Ill. App. 276, 67 N. E. (2d) 883 (1941).
As regards the prison rule in the Illinois state penitentiary which forbade the
filing of any court papers without the aid of counsel see: United States ex rel.
Bongiorno v. Ragen, 54 F. Supp. 973 (N. D. Ill. 1943) Aff'd 146 F. (2d) 349
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motion. It would seem, therefore, that after the expiration of the
five year limitation, there can be no collateral hearing upon a claim ol'
due process violation in the Illinois courts unless the statute is tolled
when ". . . the person entitled to make such a motion shall be an
infant, non compos mentis or under duress, at the time of passing
judgment." 8 2 It should be noted, however, that the Illinois Supreme
Court has not yet found it necessary squarely to decide whether the
five year limitation will apply in a case involving a constitutional
claim. The court may very well say that the five year limitation does
not apply in such cases. 33 It should also be noted that there are no
recent decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court in which the remedy
of a motion in the nature of writ of error coram nobis was attempted
in a case involving constitutional rights. It is possible that the court
will, in a due process case, give the petitioner relief where there is
no remedy by writ of error or habeas corpus, even though some of the
techincal requirements of coram nobis have not been met.
Habeas Corpus in Illinois •
It is clear that a violation of due process does not necessarily come
within the remedy of habeas corpus in Illinois. The Illinois courts
have repeatedly held that in habeas corpus proceedings the only
questions to be decided are whether the judgment challenged was
entered by a court having jurisdiction of the defendant and of the
subject matter, and with power to enter the order questioned, 34 and
whether anything has happened subsequently to render the judgment
void.3 5 Habeas corpus cannot therefore be used to perform the func-
tions of a writ of error for the purpose of reviewing errors of a
court having jurisdiction of the person and the subject matter.36 Even
though the errors claimed to have occurred at the trial might have
been of sufficient gravity to have caused a reversal upon a writ of
error, they do not furnish sufficient grounds for granting a writ of
(C. C. A. 7th) 1945) ; United States ex Tel. Foley v. Ragen, 52 F. Supp. 265 (N. D.
Ill. 1943) rvsd. 143 F. (2d) 774. (C. C. A. 7th, 1944); White v. Ragen, 324 U. S.
760, 762 (1945), footnote 1.
32 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1945) e. 110 § 72.
33 See infra note 63.
34 People ex rel. Wayman v. Zimmer, 252 Ill. 9, 96 N. E. 529 (1911); People
ex rel. Harris v. Graves, 276 Ill. 350, 114 N. E. 556 (1916); People ex rel. Huber v.
Whitman, 277 Ill. 408, 115 N. E. 531 (1917); People ex rel. Hoyne v. Windes, 283
Ill. 251, 119 N. E. 297 (1918); People ex rel. Morris v. Hazard, 356 I1. 448, 191
N. E. 54 (1934); People ex rel. Courtney v. Thompson, 358 Ill. 81, 192 N. E. 693
(1934); People ex rel. Merrill v. Hazard, 361 Ill. 60, 196 N. E. 827 (1935); People
ex rel. Courtney v. Sullivan, 363 Ill. 34, 1 N. . (2d) 306 (1936) ; People ex rel.
Swolley v. Ragen, 390 Ill. 106, 61 N. E. (2d) 248 (1945); People ex rel. Barrett v.
Bradley, 391 Il. 169, 62 N. E. (2d) 788 (1945); People ex rel. Thompson v.
Neirstheimer, 395 Ill. 572, 71 N. E. (2d) 343 (1947).
35 People ex rel. Hoyne v. Windes, 283 Ill. 251, 119 N. E. 297 (1918); People
ex rel. Courtney v. Thompson, 358 Ill. 81, 192 N. E. 093 (1934). For the statutory
provision setting forth the scope of habeas oorpus see Ill. Rev. Stat. (1945) c. 05§22.
36 People ex rel. Wayman v. Zimmer, 252 fl. 9, 96 N. E. 529 (1911); People
exr el. Crowe v. Fisher, 303 Ill. 430, 135 N. E. 751 (1922); People ex rel. Crowe v.
Williams, 330, Ill. 150, 161 N. E. 312 (1928); People ex rel. Swanson v. Kelly, 352
fll. 567, 186 N. E. 188 (1933); People ex rel. Courtney v. Prystalski, 358 Ill. 198,
192 N. E. 908 (1934); People ex rel. Merrill v. Hazard, 361 Ill. 60, 196 N. E. 827
(1935); People ex rel. Courtney v. Sullivan, 363 Ill. 34, 1 N. . (2d) 206 (1936);
People ex rel. Wakefield v. Montgomery, 365 Ill. 478, 6 N. ]." (2d) 868 (1937);
People ex rel. Swolley v. Ragen, 390 Ill. 106, 61 N. E. (2d) 248 (1945).
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habeas corpus. 37 The constitutionality of a statute under which the
petitioner was sentenced cannot be determined by habeas corpus.
38
Nor is it the proper proceeding to try the guilt or innocence of the
accused. 39
The Illinois Supreme Court and circuit courts have concurrent juris-
diction to entertain applications for writs of habeas corpus.40 The
petitioner can apply to the supreme court, to a court of competent
jurisdiction in the county where he is held, or to a court of competent
jurisdiction in the county from which he was committed. 41 However,
the supreme court generally refuses to entertain original applications
when the record on its face indicates a possibility of a trial in that
court upon an issue of fact.42 No appeal or writ of error lies to review
the order or judgment in a habeas corpus proceeding for the discharge
of a prisoner in a criminal case, as the order or judgment in such a
proceeding is not considered final in Illinois.43 However, mandamus
on the part of the people can be invoked to compel a court to expunge
an order when a judge of the circuit or criminal court has erroneously
set aside a judgment of conviction and has released a petitioner from
custody in a habeas corpus proceeding." When a writ of habeas
corpus is denied in the Illinois courts, the petitioner can apply for
writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court if a federal
question is involved.45 It can readily be seen that the great emphasis
placed upon merely testing jurisdiction makes habeas corpus an in-
adequate method of obtaining a hearing upon a claim of due process
violation resulting in conviction.
46
37 People ex rel.-Swolley v. Ragen, 390 Ill. 106, 61 N. E. (2d) 248 (1945).
38 People v. Jonas, 173 Ill. 316, 50 N. E. 1051 (1898); People v. Strassheim, 242
Ill. 359, 90 N. E. 118 (1909).
39 People ex rel. Mortenson v. O'Brien, 371 Ill. 351, 20 N. E. (2d) 782 (1939).
4011. Rev. Stat. (1945) c. 65 § 2 "Application for the writ shall be made to
the court or judge authorized to issue the same, by petition signed by the person
for whose relief it is intended, or by some person in his behalf, and verified by
affidavit; provided, that such application shall be made to the Supreme Court or to
a court of competent jurisdiction of the city or of the county in which the person
in whose behalf the application is made, is imprisoned or restrained, or to a court
of competent jurisdiction of the city from which said person was sentenced or
committed or of the county from which said person was sentenced or committed."
41 Ibid.
42 See cases cited infra note 57.
43 Hammond v. People, 32 fI1. 446 (1863) (Writ of error will not lie to review
an order rendered upon the hearing of a habeas corpus proceeding in absence of
statute; reviews English and early America cases) ; Ex Parte Thompson, 93 Ill. 69(1879); People ex rel. Magee v. McNally, 221 Ill. 66, 77 N. E. 544 (1906); People
ex rel. Maglori v. Siman, 284 Ill. 28, 119 N. E. 940 (1918).
" People v. Jonas, 173 Ill. 316, 50 N. E. 1051 (1898); People ex rel. Maglori v.
Siman, 284 Ill. 28, 119 N. E. 940 (1918); People ex rel. Carlstrom v. Shurtleff,
355 Ill. 210, 189 N. E. 291 (1933) ; People ex rel. Courtney v. Prystalski, 358 Ill. 198,
192 N. E. 908 (1934); People ex rel. Courtney v. Sullivan, 363 II. 34, 1 N. E. (2d)
206 (1936).
45 Since the denial of habeas corpus by one of the lower courts of Illinois is not
reviewable by any other court, it is a decision by the highest court of the State in
which a decision can be had and therefore subject to review by the Supreme Court
of the United States, 43 Stat. 937 (1925), 28 U. S. C. A. § 344 (1943); Betts v.
Brady, 316 U. S. 455 (1942); of. Largent v. Texas, 318 U. S. 418 (1943).
46 People v. Neirstheimer, 395 Ill. 572, 71 N. E. (2d) 343 (1947) (where peti-
tioner who was convicted of murder claimed upon application for writ of habeas
corpus from the Illinois Supreme Court that he was held incommunicado prior to
his trial and that he was deprived of his right to counsel, the court held that these
were not sufficient grounds for granting a writ of habeas corpus since in such a
proceeding only jurisdiction can be attacked).
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Treatment of Due Process Claims from Illinois in the Federal Courts
While the federal courts have the power to release petitioners held
by the states in violation of their constitutional rights upon application
for writ of habeas corpus,47 this power is used very carefully and will
only be exercised after petitioner has shown that he has exhausted
the remedies available to him within the state courts. 48
The federal district courts in Illinois and the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals have held that in order to exhaust state remedies in Illinois
it is necessary to apply for a writ of habeas corpus in each of the
courts available under the Illinois practice.49 However, when previous
decisions have foreclosed any relief in the Illinois Supreme Court
through habeas corpus, it is not necessary to attempt to secure such
relief before applying to the federal district court.50 The federal court
has no jurisdiction to entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus
where petitioner has failed to appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois
from an adverse ruling in a coram nobis proceeding,5 1 or has not
applied for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court after the
Illinois Supreme Court has affirmed the lower court's ruling denying
coram nobis.52 If petitioner originally applied for habeas corpus in
an Illinois state court and was denied relief on the merits, exhaustion
of state remedies requires that he apply for certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court before petitioning for habeas corpus in the
federal courts.53 When an interpretation of an Illinois law is involved
in the application for writ of habeas corpus in the federal court, the
47 14 Stat. 385 (1867); 28 U. S. C. A. § 453 (1928) "The writ of habeas corpus
shall in no case extend to a prisoner in jail unless where he ... is in custody in
violation of the constitution . .. " For early history of this provision and habeas
corpus generally in the federal courts, see In re Neagle, 135 U. S. 1 (1889).
48 Mooney v. Halohan, 294 U. S. 103 (1935); Ex Parte Hawk, 321 U. S. 114
(1944) and cases cited there.
49 United States ex rel. Foley v. Ragen, 143 F. (2d) 774 (C. C. A. 7th, 1944);
People ex rel. Ross v. Neirstheimer, 148 F. (2d) 8 (C. C. A. 7th, 1945); Randall v.
Becker, 60 F. Supp. 656 (E. D. Ill. 1945).
50 United States ex rel. Howard v. Ragen, 59 F. Supp. 374 (1. D. Ill. 1945)
(case involved the reinearceration of a parole violator after the original sentence
had expired); cf. Potter v. Dowd, 146 F. (2d) 244 (C. C. A. 7th 1944), noted in
39 Ill. L. Rev. 417 (1945) and 58 Harv. L. Rev. 456 (1945) (in a case arising from
Indiana, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals held that it is not necessary to exhaust
the state* remedy of habeas corpus when this is apparently futile); Williams v.
Dowd, 153 F. (2d) 328 (C. C. A. 7th 1946), noted in 22 Ind. L. J. 189 (1947)
(makes no reference to the requirement that the petitioner -exhaust his remedy of
habeas corpus in the Indiana courts before petitioning the federal district court).
Habeas corpus in Indiana is for all practical purposes an adequate remedy only to
a prisoner confined within the county in which he was convicted. See Note (1947)
22-Ind. L. J. 189.
51 United States ex rel. Gordon v. Ragen, 157 F. (2d) 766 (C. C. A. 7th, 1946).
52 United States ex rel. Johnston v. Cary, 141 F. (2d) 967 (C. C. A. 7th, 1944) ;
cert. denied *323 U. S. 717 (the petitioner had also failed to apply for habeas
corpus in the state courts).
53 Ibid. People of State of Illinois ex rel. Davidson v. Bennett, 153 F. (2d) 271
(C. C. A. 7th, 1946) (after denial of habeas in the trial court it is necessary to
apply to United States Supreme Court for certiorari); of. United States ex rel.
McCarthy v. Ragen, 153 F. (2d) 609 (C. C. A. 7th, 1946) (where petitions for
habeas corpus were denied in an inferior court and in the Illinois Supreme Court
on the merits it is necessary to apply for certiorari to United States Supreme Court
in order to exhaust state remedies). See People ex rel. Herndon v. Neirstheimer,
63 F. Supp. 594, 595 (E. D. Ill. 1945).
1947]
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Circuit Court of Appeals has held that it. is bound by the decision of
the Illinois Supreme Court.5 4
Two United States Supreme Court cases in recent years have dealt
with elements of exhaustion of state remedies in Illinois. In the case of
White v. Ragen55 the Court held that it was unnecessary to apply for
writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court in order to
exhaust state remedies when an application for writ of habeas corpus
has been denied without opinion by the Supreme Court of Illinois, and
hence it could not be said that the petition for habeas'corpus was denied
on its merits rather than on adequate state grounds. This opinion dealt
with the claims of two petitioners, one claiming that he had been con-
victed of "obtaining money and goods by means of the confidence
game" without having been given adequate representation by counsel,
and the other petitioner claiming that he was convicted of murder
through the known use of perjured testimony. The Court acknowl-
edged that the petitioners' allegations presented a prima facie case of
constitutional violations,5 6 but could not consider the merits of their
claims, because the Supreme Court of Illinois may have denied the
petitions for habeas corpus upon adequate state grounds. The adequate
state grounds in these cases may very well have been the practice of
the Illinois Supreme Court of refusing to entertain original applica-
tions for habeas corpus where the record on its face indicates the pos-
sibility of a trial in that court on an issue of fact.57 The Court further
held that dismissing certiorari in these two cases under these circum-
stances did not bar application for relief to a federal district court
grounded on the federal rights which the Supreme Court of Illinois has
allegedly denied, but any other state remedies, if available, must be
exhausted before applying to the federal district court.58
In Van Woods v. Neirstheimer,59 the petitioner was adjudged guilty
of murder in the Criminal Court of Cook County in 1940, and was sen-
tenced to serve ninety-nine years in the state penitentiary. In 1945 he
filed two identical petitions for habeas corpus, one in the Criminal
Court of Cook County, and the other in the Randolph County Circuit
Court in which he claimed that he was forced to sign a confession of
murder after he had been beaten and threatened. He also alleged that
he could not employ counsel and that he was not adequately repre-
sented by the counsel appointed by the court, that the public counsel
would not allow the petitioner to explain the circumstances surrounding
the confession and entered a plea of guilty despite the petitioner's re-
peated assertions of innocence. The applications were denied in both
state courts for failure to state a cause of action and neither court
wrote an opinion explaining the denial. These cases were brought to
the United States Supreme Court on certiorari and both denials of habeas
54 Whitten v. Bennet, 141 F. (2d) 295 (C. C. A. 7th, 1944); United States ex
rel. Reno v. Ragen, 151 F. (2d) 447 (C. C. A. 7th, 1945).
55 324 U. S. 760 (1945); noted in 34 I1. B. J. 535 (1946).
56 See supra note 1.
57 People ex rel Swolley v. Ragen, 390 Ill. 106, 61 N. E. (2d) 248 (1945); of.
North Chicago Hebrew Congregation v. Board of Appeals, 358 Ill. 549, 193 N. E.
519 (1934). See United States ex rel Hall v. Ragen, 60 F. Supp. 820, 824 (N. D.
Ill. 1945).
58 See cases cited supra note 48.
59 328 U. S. 211, (1946).
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corpus were considered together. The Court, in an opinion written by
Justice Black, dismissed the suit on the ground that the denials of appli-
cation for habeas corpus in the trial courts could have rested upon ade-
quate state grounds since the proper remedy for relief from judgments
violating due process of law in Illinois is provided by a statutory substi-
tute for the common law writ of error coram nobis. In answer to the peti-
tioner's claim that this remedy was no longer available to him because
the five year statutory limitation had been exceeded, the Court said
that it would be necessary to obtain an adverse ruling by the Illinois
Supreme Court on an attempt to obtain relief through the statutory
substitute of writ of error coram nobis before the Supreme Court could
assume that the petitioner had no remedy in the state of Illinois.
In the recent case of United States ex rel. Rooney v. Ragen,60 how-
ever, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals appears to have eliminated
the requirement of filing a motion in the nature of writ of error coram
nobis before obtaining relief in the federal courts when the statutory
limitation of five years has expired. The court points out that four
months prior to the Van Woods case, the Illinois Supreme Court in
People v. Rave6l definitely held that the remedy of writ of error coram
nobis is not available unless it is brought within five years after rendi-
tion of the final judgment as provided by Section 72 of the Civil Prac-
tice Act. "It is, therefore, difficult to comprehend the statement of the
court in the Van Woods case upon any basis other than that the law of
Illinois, as decided by the Supreme Court in the Rave case, was not
called to its attention." 6 2 The court then reversed an order denying an
application for writ of habeas corpus and remanded the case to the
district court. The court felt that since the remedy of writ of error
coram nobis was apparently no longer available because eleven years
had elapsed since the final judgment in the case, it could not interpret
the Van Woods case to require the petitioner to make a futile applica-
tion before giving him relief upon his claim of due process deprivation. 63
60158 F. (2d) 346 (C. C. A. 7th, 1946), Cert. denied ... U. S. ... , 67 S. Ct. 1532
(1947). Petitioner in applying for writ of habeas corpus in the federal district
court claimed he was convicted of murder through the known use of perjured
testimony and he had not been allowed to institute court action because of a prison
rule forbidding it.
61 392 Ill. 435, 65 N. E. (2d) 23 (1936). The case of People v. Austin et al.,
329 Il. App. 276, 67 N. E. (2d) 883 (1946), decided after the Van Woods case,
was also relied upon to show that the remedy of a motion in natuie of writ of
error coram nobis was not available after the five year statutory limitation has
expired. See text supra at note 29.
62 The Rave case actually was relied on by petitioner Van Woods and was cited
to the Supreme Court. Page 12 of petitioner's brief.
-63 It was the position of the Attorney General of the state of Illinois in the
state's petition for rehearing in this case that the Rave case is not binding in a
case where a constitutional question is presented. "In the Rave case, although
the prisoner had been confined in the penitentiary for five years, he made no showing
that his attempts to communicate with the state or federal courts had been inter-
fered with." Therefore, the Attorney General argues that since there was no con-
stitutional issue presented in the Rave case it should not be construed as setting
a five year limitation for invoking coram nobis where there is a claim that attempts
to communicate with the courts have been interfered with. The Attorney General
further contends that the Austin Case is not authoritative because it is a decision
of an appellate court" . .. and under Illinois appellate jurisprudence, one who
appeals to the appellate court waives all questions arising under the state and
federal constitutions."
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To sum up: before obtaining relief in the federal district courts
through habeas corpus proceeding upon a claim of a federal right, the
petitioner in exhausting his state remedies in Illinois must apply for a
writ of habeas corpus in each of the courts available to him under the
Illinois statute; he must apply for certiorari from the Supreme Court
of the United, States when a denial of the writ of habeas corpus is upon
the merits, but not when habeas corpus is denied without opinion by the
Illinois Supreme Court. It is also necessary to file a motion in the
nature of writ of error coram nobis, if applicable, but not after the five
year limitation. If the motion is filed, there must be an appeal from
an adverse ruling to the highest court in Illinois followed by an applica-
tion for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.
The Problem
As yet it appears that the state of Illinois does not have an adequate
procedure for obtaining collateral relief from unconstitutional convic-
tions, particularly after the five year period during which the motion
under Section 72 is available. One answer to this problem, of course, is
that the state of Illinois need not provide an adequate procedure for
collateral attack of convictions obtained in violation of due process,
because there is an adequate remedy in habeas corpus proceedings in
the federal courts. However, a better solution to this problem would be
an affirmative attempt to set up procedures within the state of Illinois
whereby basic constitutional rights may be protected. It is particularly
important that an adequate procedure for collateral attack of uncon-
stitutional convictions be provided since, in at least one respect, the re-
quirement of due process in Illinois has not kept pace with the standards
of United States Supreme Court decisions of recent years. In Illinois
no duty rests upon the court to provide legal assistance unless the de-
fendant states under oath that he needs it.64 This is quite different from
the Supreme Court's ruling that it is the responsibility of the court to
provide legal assistance, whether asked for or not, in cases involving
serious crimes when the defendant is incapable of defending himself, or
of making an intelligent waiver of his right to counsel.65 Since the
requirement of due process in recent years has also been extended to
cover situations in which the defendant has been convicted on the
strength of a confession procured by coercion, 66 or where he was con-
victed through the known use of material perjured testimony,6 7 it
should be the duty of the state of Illinois to provide an adequate method
64 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1945) e. 38, § 730, "Every person charged with a crime shall
be allowed counsel and when he shall state upon oath that he is unable to procure
counsel, the court shall assign him competent counsel, who shall conduct his defense
." People v. Loftus, 395 Ill. 479, 70 N. E. (2d) 573 (1946) (where the Illinois
Supreme Court refused to reverse a conviction for armed robbery and burglary
even though the accused advised the court that he had no funds to employ counsel,
but failed to so state under oath); People v. Corbett, 387 Ill. 41, 55 N. E. (2d)
74 (1944); People v. Childers, 386 Ill. 312, 53 N. E. (2d) 878 (1944); People v.
Corrie, 387 Il. 587, 56 N. E. (2d) 767 (1944); People v. Bernovich, 391 Ill. 14.1,
62 N. E. (2d) 691 (1945).
The Illinois constitution, it appears, is capable of a broader interpretation than
is set forth in the statute. Art. II §9. "In all criminal prosecutions the accused
shall have the right to appear and defend in person by counsel ...





whereby such convictions may be attacked collaterally within the state
courts. It should be as much a responsibility of the states to provide a
forum for the protection of fundamental constitutional rights as it is
of the federal courts. The fact that ,relief may eventually be obtained
in the federal courts after exhaustion of state remedies is no reason for
refusing to improve the remedies available within the Illinois courts.
Possible Remedies
A step in the right direction might be to eliminate the five year limit
in filing a motion in the nature of writ of error coram nobis in cases
where the petitioner claims he was the victim of an unconstitutional
conviction. In this class of cases the common law limitation of laches
would appear to be more appropriate than an arbitrary five year limit.68
However, at best, the relief available under a writ of error coram nobis
is very uncertain. 69 The technical requirements of coram nobis are too
inflexible for the protection of fundamental constitutional rights, par-
ticularly since these requirements are by no means easy to apply to any
given situation. While the removal of the present five year limitation
for filing a motion under Section 72 of the Civil Practice Act would be
desirable since this is apparently the only collateral relief available
within Illinois at the present time, it would still fail to meet the need
of a flexible procedure in these cases.
A more desirable approach to this problem would be to change the
nature of habeas corpus in Illinois to correspond with the treatment
given habeas corpus proceedings attacking unconstitutional convictions
in the federal courts. In the case of Johnson v. Zerbst70 where the peti-
tioner alleged that he was convicted without having had the aid of
counsel, the court held that if the allegation was true, or if petitioner
had not made an intelligent waiver of counsel as guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment, the trial court lost jurisdiction to convict, the re-
sulting judgment is void, and the court could grant petitioner relief
upon a writ of habeas corpus. 71 In Waley v. Johnston72 the court held
that the writ of habeas corpus was an appropriate remedy in the fed-
eral courts where there was a claim that the petitioner was coerced into
pleading guilty to a charge of kidnapping, and there was no indication
of this in the record, making an appeal by writ of error of no value.
Habeas corpus is appropriate in the federal courts in "those excep-
tional cases where the conviction has been in disregard of the consti-
tutional rights of the accused, and where the writ is the only effective
means of preserving his rights.' '7"
6s Strode v. The Stafford Justices, 23 Fed. Cas. 236, No. 13, 567 (C. C. Va.
181-0) Qin a case decided by Chief Justice Marshall on circuit, the writ of coram
nobis was granted fourteen years after judgment); Bronson v. Schulten, 104 U. S.
410 (1881); Kemp v. Cook, 18 Md. 130, 79 Am. Dec. 681 (1861); Scott v. Rees, 300
Mo. 123, 253.S. IV. 998 (1923).
69 See discussion in text supra at note 27.
70 304 U. S. 458 (1938).
71 Walker v. Johnston, 312 U. S. 275 (1941) (petitioner is entitled to a hearing
upon a writ of habaes corpus when lie claims that he was induced to plead guilty
to an indictment for a federal offense without the aid of counsel and in ignorance
of that right where record does not contradict the petitioner's claim).
72316 U. S. 101 (1942).
73 Id. at 105.
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